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Non-technical summary
A major challenge in addressing the loss of benefits and services provided by the natural
environment is that it can be difficult to find ways for those who benefit from them to pay
for their preservation. We examine one such context in Malawi, where erosion from soils dis-
turbed by agriculture affects not only farmers’ incomes, but also damages aquatic habitat and
inhibits the storage and hydropower potential of dams downstream. We demonstrate that
payments from hydropower producers to farmers to maintain land cover and prevent erosion
can have benefits for all parties involved.
Technical summary
Payments for ecosystem services (PES) schemes provide a mechanism to connect beneficiaries
of ecosystem services with those whose actions could provide them. Recent work on PES has
demonstrated a priority on matching costs and benefits at the margin, where, on the whole,
payments are also low. We draw on dynamic systems theory to demonstrate that reinforcing
feedbacks that benefit ecosystem services producers may warrant much higher initial invest-
ments in PES programs, and provide evidence of behavioural drivers from a PES trial in
Malawi to support these claims. Specifically, in our study, peer effects and improvement to
soil structure are processes that can encourage adoption of sustainable land management
practices, alongside or in the absence of other incentives. Under this framing, PES programs
can be vehicles to shift systems between basins of attraction over a time-limited period, rather
than programs necessary for long-term maintenance of services.
1. Introduction
Many of humanity’s practices impose external costs to the environment – whether in affecting
soils, water or air quality, or degrading the environment in other ways [1–6]. These externa-
lized costs, arising through developing private goods, affect a range of ecosystem services (ES).
While ES are often valued – as they provide a range of public goods – they are typically unmo-
netized and thus unmarketized [7]. Payments for ecosystem services (PES) schemes are an
attempt to close this loophole, by incentivising actors to avoid benefitting from the devaluation
of non-pecuniary public goods.
Since PES programs were devised in the 1990s, and widely implemented in the 2000s [8], we
have learned much about what makes them work well to deliver, as a primary goal, sustained
benefit streams derived from ES (e.g., [9–11]). First, there should be one or more beneficiaries
willing to pay more for a set of ecosystem service benefits than the opportunity costs to the pro-
vider(s) in facilitating them [11]. Second, having a monopsony – a single buyer who reaps all the
benefits of the service – can eliminate the problem of free-riding andmake that willingness to pay
clear and transparent, while having a larger number of potential sellers can help to break up the
potential for monopoly pricing from the provider [9]. Third, when either services or willingness
to pay are spread across a large number of providers or buyers (e.g., land managers or farmers),
transaction costs can dissipate much of the potential gains from exchange [12,13], so that inter-
mediaries such as brokers can be critical to enable PES programs to function [9]. These inter-
mediaries include extension agencies for smallholder farmers, or water or electric utilities [14]
for the consumers of drinkingwater and hydropower. Fourth, whennot prohibited by transaction
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costs, and where poor smallholders are among the key providers,
PES programs can provide pathways for poverty alleviation [13],
which may be a significant incentive for providers to engage.
Where PES programs can be financed by beneficiaries, rather
than government or other outside donors [15], with some degree
of permanence [11], they are more likely to be sustained [14].
However, unsustainable practices are often remarkably resili-
ent to change, because externalizing costs are attractive for two
main reasons. First, a lack of transparency – as different services
trade-off against each other, and have different impacts at differ-
ent scales [16,17] – means actors are often unaware of how their
actions impact the wider environment. Second, without transpar-
ency and without accountability, internalizing the external costs is
often prohibitively expensive [7]. This can arise through other,
competing incentives from markets or public money – for
example, privileging cheaper food over ES through subsidizing
production. Articulating this ‘lock-in’ within a dynamical systems
framework suggests we can view the resilience of unsustainable
practices as a stable state within a basin of attraction (Figure 1).
While PES schemes have been well-studied in many regards,
their potential to encourage transformation of the system from
a less sustainable to a more sustainable state is under explored.
Transforming the system from an unsustainable, undesirable
state to a more sustainable, desirable state is a more fundamental
goal than simply maintaining an ecosystem service arising from a
system that is fundamentally unsustainable.
From dynamical systems theory, a basin of attraction describes
a locally stable state that is by definition resilient to change. There
may be more desirable stable states, but the basin creates lock-in,
which makes it difficult for the system to transition. In many
cases, the provision of ES benefits to local actors allows the exist-
ence of an alternative stable state that is more desirable for long-
term sustainability (Figure 1), but which cannot be easily reached
because of the local stability of the current basin. From this per-
spective, PES may serve primarily as a vehicle to lower the barriers
preventing a shift of the system between basins of attraction (from
a state that undermines ES provision to a state that enhances ES
provision) (e.g., [18]) (Figure 1).
Using PES schemes as a means of transforming the system to
create a long-term, stable, systemic shift to a more desirable state
is a novel framing of the issue. Kemkes et al. (2010) note the
potential for lasting change that can come when the PES program
encourages services that are locally valuable to the providers
themselves [9] (such as where sustainable land management prac-
tices to discourage sediment loading also improve local soil and
crop conditions [19]). Here, we develop a systems dynamical
conceptual framework, for using PES to move between basins of
attraction; once the shift to a more desirable state has occurred,
the need for PES is reduced.
2. Stable states depend on feedbacks: a ‘feedback view’
of PES
For a system to be stable, when it is perturbed, negative feedbacks
push the system back to equilibrium. In Figure 1, the feedbacks
are represented by the cup: a perturbation pushes the system up
the walls of the cup, but the feedbacks roll it back downwards.
The key concept is for PES to act to reduce the lip between adja-
cent basins, such that the system moves to the adjacent basin for
long enough that feedbacks can become established to ‘deepen’
the more desirable basin of attraction, in order to make it stable
in the absence of PES.
To illustrate this process, we imagine the general problem of a
physical landscape that would be better served by a practice
(avoiding deforestation, soil conservation, etc) that individuals
are (or believe themselves to be) made worse off by adopting
(Figure 2A). Risks and costs borne or perceived by land users
as they attempt the pro-environmental practice – lost income as
forests are left to grow, or yields decline – dissuade adoption in
a balancing feedback, so that the absence of the practice in the
landscape is a stable state.
The most basic opportunity in the PES space to address such
problems is the externally supported PES program (Figure 2B).
These programs – such as Brazil’s Bolsa Floresta Program, in
which government and international donor funds support a
monthly stipend to families and communities for engaging in
non-deforesting activities – are scalable to large areas, but typic-
ally lack the efficiency that a market feedback would provide [20].
Where the beneficiaries of the generated ES are able and will-
ing to pay for them, the next opportunity is the user-supported
PES program (Figure 2C). While such programs might begin
with or benefit to some degree from external support, they exploit
a reinforcing feedback by linking beneficiaries’ willingness to pay
through to providers’ ability and willingness to act. On its own,
this qualitative leap improves the potential permanence of PES
outcomes by weakening the role of external support and embed-
ding a market feedback.
This reinforcing feedback has been the focus of much aca-
demic work on the design of PES schemes [11,15,20], but there
is often much greater potential for developing feedbacks that pro-
vide self-reinforcing benefits [9]. In particular, where the goals of
the PES program stand to directly provide private benefits to the
providers themselves, there is greater potential for lasting ES ben-
efits (Figure 2D), which may underpin the stability of the system
in a more desirable state. In other words, enhancing the self-
reinforcing management feedbacks can transform the system
over time, diminishing the importance of risks, costs and even
payments themselves in directing system behaviour, and with
the actors valuing the transformed state more than the original
state. In the terms of Figure 1, such feedbacks deepen the basin
of attraction of the alternative state, making it more resilient
and more beneficial over the long term.
3. A concrete example
To illustrate the potential for systemic transformation, we focus
on the issue of conservation agriculture in a landscape context.
Conservation agriculture is a set of land management practices
that, while taking various forms across the globe [21], typically
includes (i) minimal or no tillage of soils; (ii) crop residue mulch-
ing or a permanent cover crop; and (iii) intercropping or rotation
of legumes. The adoption of conservation agriculture over
Fig. 1. Payments for ecosystem services (PES) can help shift the system from an
unsustainable to a sustainable state by reducing ‘lock in’ to the former.
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‘conventional’ agriculture has short-term costs for farmers (prin-
cipally in requiring more inputs, and also a reduction in yields).
Over time, yields tend to recover as these interrelated practices
build more fertile soils that store more carbon, hold more mois-
ture and resist erosion under rainfall, leading to more resilient
and sustainable agricultural livelihoods. Thus, while long-term
benefits of adoption are clear, the short-term costs of adoption
typically act as a barrier, trapping farmers in the less desirable
state (Figure 1). In a two-year study in the Shire River Basin
Catchment Area in Malawi, we designed and tested a PES scheme
that has the potential to allow a systemic transformation, if imple-
mented at scale and as a time-limited investment. Below, we show
how we implemented an innovative PES scheme that significantly
improved uptake over other PES schemes, and how uptake would
create significant benefits for the hydropower sector. As adoption
of conservation agriculture (CA) creates benefits for adopters over
a 5-year time window, this scheme has the potential to drive
systemic transformation through the development of feedback
mechanisms (Figure 2D).
4. Study area – The Shire River Basin Catchment Area,
Malawi
Our study was conducted in the three most upstream riparian dis-
tricts to the Shire River in Southern Malawi (Balaka, Machinga
and Zomba; Figure 3). Like much of Malawi, farming in this
region focuses on maize production, encouraged by the Farm
Inputs Subsidy Programme (FISP). Initiated in 2005, the FISP
takes up 10–15% of Malawi’s national budget through provision
of subsidies on fertilizer (a coupon for two 50 kg bags at
two-thirds the market price) and free improved seeds to the ‘pro-
ductive poor’ [22], the approximately 1.5 million smallholders
identified as standing to benefit from the program. Though the
FISP has included legume seeds since 2008 [23], a number of
Fig. 2. A feedback model of Payments for ecosystem services (PES) programs, using causal loop diagrams. A) The general problem where actors are better off not
adopting pro-environmental behaviour. B) An externally supported PES program, where incentives outweigh the costs and pro-environmental behaviour is
adopted. C) A user-supported PES program, where users benefit sufficiently to fund the incentives without external income. D) A user-supported PES program
with local private benefits, where both users and adopters directly benefit from the provision of ecosystem services. In all panels, a ‘B’ indicates a balancing feed-
back loop, and ‘R’ a reinforcing feedback loop. An arrow marked with a ‘+’ sign indicates a direct relationship between system components, while an arrow marked
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studies have found that any gains in maize production come at the
expense of crop diversity, squeezing out legume crops for which
strong markets do not exist [24–26].
Consequently, the FISP re-enforced intensive monocrop maize
production, leading to erosion of exposed topsoil, which is a key
issue for Malawi and the Shire River Basin region in particular,
both for the smallholder livelihoods dependent upon the product-
ive capacity of the soil as well as for its effect on the disruption of
rivers’ sediment flow, consequently damaging fisheries and hin-
dering hydropower generation [27]. To address this problem,
the Government of Malawi has, as part of its Agriculture Sector
Wide Approach (ASWAp) and the more recent National
Agricultural Policy, promoted the adoption of CA [28,29] via
such approaches as demonstration plots and improved extension
services. These efforts by the government to encourage CA fit into
a landscape of CA promotion efforts by other research or civil
society organizations (e.g., [30]), yet to our knowledge there
have not been widespread efforts to reward CA adoption with
individual compensation in the manner by which the FISP
encourages the use of fertilizer.
However, the aforementioned linkage from smallholder land
use through to hydropower generation – in the Shire Basin and
elsewhere – provides a unique opportunity in that smallholders
can potentially provide a valuable ecosystem service (avoiding
sediment loading to rivers) for which there are direct beneficiaries
(electricity consumers) willing to pay. While both of these groups
(smallholders and electricity users) are spread widely across
Malawi, there are clear ‘brokers’ for each that can facilitate pay-
ment from one to the other. On the consumer side, the utility
provider ESCOM provides this service implicitly via billing to
consumers (which could embed tariffs to pay for sediment man-
agement). On the smallholder provider side, extension agencies
and input dealers are among the many potential ‘brokers,’ groups
with established links to smallholder communities that can reduce
the transaction costs that can drown many other similar systems
[13]. However ideal the context may be to encourage CA, it is
currently practiced sparsely in Malawi (less than 1–2% of cropped
land) [31–33], with most topsoil left exposed after harvests,
vulnerable to erosion and sedimentation of the Shire River.
5. Methods and analysis
To examine the potential for individual incentives, we evaluated
an innovative ‘agglomeration payment’ scheme using a rando-
mized control trial, contrasting a control (no payment) with a
standard subsidy (for adopting the three CA practices, no-till,
mulching and rotations) or agglomeration payment (a smaller
base subsidy plus a bonus payment for each adopting contiguous
neighbour) [34]. Our control reflects the background level of CA
encouragement in the region, such as trainings and field demon-
strations from extension officers, while our standard subsidy and
agglomeration payment treatments added only the individual
incentive, introduced via a basic village-level sensitization exercise
and registration period, without any additional training on CA.
The standard subsidy was approximately US$ 3 per tenth of an
acre, for up to one acre across multiple plots. The agglomeration
treatment included a base subsidy (approximately US$ 2.5 per
tenth of an acre) plus a bonus payment for every neighbour
who also participated in the experiment (about US$ 0.25 per
contiguous neighbour, per tenth of an acre, up to a total of four
neighbours). These levels were calibrated using a discrete choice
experiment (see [35]) to avoid floor and ceiling effects (no adop-
tion and full adoption, respectively), with approximate parity
across the treatments assuming participation by two neighbours
on average.
We constructed a simple random sample of 60 villages from a
pooled list of all villages in the five Extension Planning Areas
(EPAs) riparian to the Shire River in Balaka, Machinga and
Zomba Districts. Villages were randomly allocated to one of six
treatments (eight villages each) or to the control (12 villages).
The treatments followed a 2 × 3 design of payment structure and
monitoring frequency. Monitoring levels varied from (i) complete
(plot visit for all registrants), (ii) partial (plot visit for a half of
registrants, selected randomly; in-person follow-up for remaining
registrants), to (iii) absent (no plot visits for any participants;
in-person follow-up for all registrants). Sensitization and registra-
tion efforts were coordinated by the National Smallholder Farmers’
Association of Malawi (NASFAM) and the Department of Land
Resources Conservation (DLRC). Survey data collection was con-
ducted by graduate students from Bunda College of the Lilongwe
University of Agriculture and Natural Resources (LUANAR).
Payments were made in the form of a voucher for agricultural
inputs; the voucher program was directed by NASFAM and
Agora Ltd (a network of agricultural input depots across southern
Malawi), who accepted the voucher as cash and provided mobile
shops for remote villages participating in our trial.
The experiment ran from June/July 2014 through to endline
data collection in October 2016. Here, we report results from our
endline survey. The participants for this were a representative, clus-
ter randomized sample of 30 household heads within 60 villages
(n = 30 × 60 = 1800). These data thus reflect land use practices of
individuals randomly selected from villages where incentives
were available (or not, in the case of control villages), rather than
of individuals directly receiving treatment. We did not focus in
the current analysis on differences across treatments (i.e., compar-
isons between standard subsidies and agglomeration payments) but
rather, we present a simple analysis of the overall intention-to-treat
effect (i.e., the average effect, across all treatments, of the
Fig. 3. Study area, showing the Extension Planning Areas (EPAs) chosen as the sam-
pling frame.
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treatment being available) by difference-in-difference comparison
against our control, measuring the fraction of cropped area
reported as being under CA. This effect is a rough indicator of
the costs of encouraging adoption of CA in the region (across a
range of program structures), rather than an assessment of any
particular program structure. We use this effect, along with cost
data from our project and secondary data on erosion rates
under CA, to estimate the cost of avoiding sediment loading to
surface water via sustainable land management, and compare it
to current reported costs of sediment management faced by the
hydropower provider ESCOM. Finally, we examine adoption of
CA at the plot level within our endline sample using a probit ana-
lysis, and note the key predictors of adoption within both our
treatment and control.
6. Results
6.1. Effectiveness of PES at driving adoption
Our large-scale study allows detailed analysis of the factors that
shape whether a farmer would practice CA on a given plot
(Table S1). Principal results are that (i) incentives to the respond-
ent increased adoption, but (ii) whether their neighbours had
adopted had an impact of similar magnitude (their coefficients
are not significantly different, using Wald tests with a 5% prob-
ability of Type I error). Importantly for the eventual diffusion
of CA to scale, the influence of neighbours on adoption was
also observed for the practices of zero-tillage and mulching in
our control. Finally, (iii) the availability of an incentive served
to amplify discriminating factors in farmers thinking through
the decision to adopt. For example, knowledge about CA practices
from extension agents, along with perceptions that adopting the
practices of zero tillage or intercropping would reduce overall
risks of crop loss, all increase the likelihood of adoption of CA,
with these factors explaining much more variation across adopters
and non-adopters in the treatment villages than in the control
villages.
On average across various treatments, our PES scheme
increases adoption rates for CA at 170% above control. In absolute
terms, our intervention – which entailed no extension or CA pro-
motional activities – was responsible for CA on an additional 7%
of cropped land across our villages (Table 1). CA adoption for
Malawi is known to be low [32,33] and our incentive scheme is
highly successful in this context.
6.2 The economics of siltation avoided
We construct a simple model for the cost of avoided sediment as
follows. CA is known to reduce soil and sediment loss by around
65% [36,37]. We assume that topsoil lost from fields would even-
tually make its way to rivers. Benefits from CA to the farmer can
take several years to accrue [38], and we assume that farmers
would require 3–5 years of encouragement before they would
stick with CA on their own. From these assumptions and knowing
the costs in our experiment (approximately US$ 30,000 across
treatment villages), we obtain an estimate of the direct costs of
avoiding sediment loading to be approximately US$ 7 per ton.
This estimate is, of course, sensitive to assumptions made
(Appendix). If we assume that payments would need to be
made in perpetuity, this cost rises to around US$ 20 per ton; if
we further assume that indirect costs (monitoring, logistics, etc)
are identical (per unit area) with those in our small-scale research
study (and so no economies of scale), costs rise to US$ 200 per
ton. Acknowledging that not all areas pose the same risks to sur-
face water, and assuming that only 50, 25 or 10% of eroded sedi-
ment reaches the river system raises these worst-case estimates to
near US$ 400, 800 and 2000 per ton, respectively.
7. Discussion
Many of the ecological and environmental challenges of our time
require a systemic transformation from a ‘business as usual’ state,
where environments are degraded, to a more desirable state where
human–environment interactions are managed more sustainably.
However, due to a variety of lock-ins, business as usual is often
highly robust to change. Our concept here is that PES schemes
have the unrecognized potential to act to disrupt the lock-ins
and incentivize transformation. Our field study provides the
logic. A rapid adoption of CA would quickly provide reduction
in siltation rate. Adoption rates suggest that if the scheme was
scaled up, it would drive a significant reduction in the amount
of soil lost from fields that ends up blocking rivers and hydro-
power schemes. If the electricity provider ESCOM ran the
scheme, we estimate that it should cost between US$ 7 and US$
2000 per ton of sediment avoided. Importantly for comparison,
ESCOM estimates its own costs of sediment management
(which involve equipment rental, dredging and scheduled shut-
downs) on the order of US$ 150,000 per ton of sediment over
the last year as of the time of writing [39]. Under even our
most conservative assumptions, the cost of avoiding sedimenta-
tion in the first place by encouraging CA as a land management
practice is orders of magnitude lower than costs currently being
borne by ESCOM. Even when considering the transaction costs
that might be necessary for this type of scheme to be operationa-
lized, Figure 2C is a realistic representation of the conditions that
could occur soon after a roll-out of the scheme at scale.
Table 1. Reported fraction of cropped area under conservation agriculture in
Endline Survey
Baseline year Year 1 Year 2 Difference
Controls 0.061 0.123 0.124 0.063
Treatments 0.080 0.175 0.213 0.133
Difference in differences: 0.070
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Conceptually, this provides the grounds for the systemic trans-
formation shown between Figure 2C and Figure 2D. As the scheme
matures, over a 3- to 5-year period, self-reinforcing benefits are
predicted to emerge to lock the system into the more sustainable
state. Clearly, ESCOM would benefit from lower siltation, but
over time, adopters would also increasingly benefit for two
reasons, both self-reinforcing. Firstly, the improvement in soil
structure over progressive seasons reduces input needs and poten-
tially boosts yields [40] (R2 in Figure 4); at the same time, it
reduces the risks and costs that inhibit adoption (R3 in Figure 4)
– nutrient immobilization, hard pans, pest outbreaks in residues
and waterlogging, among others [35,41]. Second, peer effects
imply that the additional incentive required to encourage new
adopters is less and less important as conservation agriculture
fills the landscape, and observations of (or suggestion from) neigh-
bours reshapes attitudes about the practice (R4 in Figure 4).
Referring back to the ball and cup analogy of Figure 1, the PES
scheme initially removes the ‘lip’ allowing the ball to roll from the
undesirable state into the desirable one, and then as reinforcing
feedback loops emerge and benefits accrue, the desirable basin
deepens, making the desirable state more stable. In this system
there is potential to take advantage of four different reinforcing
feedbacks. Over time, the scale of payments required in R1 may
abate, so that spending in the PES program is more akin to build-
ing equity, and paying a mortgage, than it is to making regular
payments as in a rental agreement. It may be possible to reach
an endpoint where additional risks to farmers from practicing
CA are negligible, payments are not required, and the private
benefits of CA are sufficient to self-reinforce practice.
The potential for such longer-term feedbacks exists in any
system where, as Kemkes et al. (2010) describe, the requirements
of the PES program lead to provisioning of services that them-
selves are locally valuable to the providers [9]. This should be
broadly true for sustainable land management initiatives such as
ours, where improved soil management offers benefits to agricul-
tural livelihoods. Pagiola et al. (2016) evaluated land use in a
Colombian region several years after a PES program to encourage
new silvopastoral practices (such as planting shrubs and trees
within pastures) had ended and found the practices still in
place, with the authors suggesting that “by reducing the initial
costs of adoption and providing some income in the period before
silvopastoral practices begin to generate sufficient benefits to be
profitable, the payments ‘tipped the balance’ towards adoption.”
[42]. It may also apply to PES programs where the requirement
is to ‘abstain’ rather than ‘do,’, though Börner et al. (2017) note
in their recent review of PES effectiveness that to their knowledge,
no comparable evaluation to that of Pagiola et al. (2016) yet exists
for this form of avoided ecosystem service loss problem [43]. They
call for greater empirical study of long-term permanence in gains
across all forms of PES program but note that in avoided ES loss
cases, they “would, all else being equal, not expect permanence
without payment” [43]. Our framework suggests that, in instances
where payments to refrain from deforestation enhance locally
valuable regulatory services such as precipitation or provisioning
services such as non-timber forest products, gains in avoided
deforestation or afforestation might persist past the end of
payments, but acknowledge that this requires these services to
be valued (or at least recognized) in a way they had not been
previously. It may be that stable, desirable basins of attractions
are more closely associated with ‘do’ PES programs than ‘abstain’
programs, but we agree with Börner et al. (2017) that greater
empirical efforts at evaluation must be made.
This paper puts forward a conceptual framework for thinking
about PES programs as levers to effect systemic transformation.
There ismuch discussion in the literature about the unsustainability
of many management practices for land, water and air [1,2,44–46].
At the same time, there is significant literature about the need to
make human systems resilient to perturbations, using resilience as
a positive, normative, concept [47–50]. Here we frame conven-
tional management practices as building a ‘wrong sort of resili-
ence,’ locking agricultural systems in to an undesirable state. In
such cases, we need to reduce the resilience to allow the system
transformation to a more desirable state. We indicate that time-
limited PES schemes have the ability to effect this transformation.
Once transformed, the ‘right sort’ of resilience can emerge as the
self-reinforcing feedback loops develop, thereby allowing the
withdrawal of the incentive scheme.
This idea brings a new perspective to an argument that took
place in the journal Conservation Letters several years ago about
the role of PES programs in tackling conservation challenges.
Muradian et al. (2013) argued that making payments risked dis-
rupting other intrinsic motivations for conservation, could lead
to spiraling compensation costs as the opportunity cost of conser-
vation rose, and was in many cases a distraction from careful rule-
making to address the problem [51]. Responding to these claims,
Wunder (2013) laid out a comprehensive accounting of the eco-
nomic, cultural and institutional preconditions that can make PES
an effective conservation tool [52]. Notably among these, Wunder
emphasizes that benefits should exceed the marginal cost of ser-
vice provision. We argue that this focus on benefits at the margin,
appearing regularly in the literature on PES programs (e.g., [9,11])
misses the system-level benefits that are possible when payments
are calibrated not to just cover costs but to help tip systems into
more productive and/or sustainable basins of attraction, and we
develop a systems framework for PES-driven conservation to
demonstrate.
While PES-for-systems-transformation is conceptually feas-
ible, building an evidence base to support it requires long-term
research efforts and, importantly, sustained commitments from
donors and implementing stakeholders. The findings here are
limited in the way of many studies linking ES to poverty and
behavioural change – the shorter-term structure of most research
projects (3–4 years, with 1–3 years of data collection) provides an
insufficient window into the system of interest to observe progress
along an ES or poverty alleviation pathway, especially one seeking
a non-linear transformation. This window will not capture the
emergence of private benefits from CA as soil structure improves
(4–8 years), nor shifts in adoption along the dry–wet cycle of an
El Niño Southern Oscillation (3–7 years). While long-term
projects supported by repeated rounds of funding are not
unheard of, they are not common enough for long-term studies
of ecosystem-based poverty reduction to shape the scientific
literature, which reinforces a bias towards linear, incremental
thinking, in a non-linear world [53]. Finding mechanisms to
reshape project funding to an ecosystems timescale (∼8–10
years) will greatly benefit analysis of system behaviour such as
that presented here.
Supplementary material. To view supplementary material for this article,
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